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In the late 1990s many European countries started comprehensive restructuring of their energy industries, the typical 
ingredients of  the reforms are full or partial privatization, vertical disintegration, liberalization. In this paper we focus on 
the way in which energy sector reforms affect social affordability. The aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of energy 
reforms on the household probability of experiencing utilities deprivation (that is, to be unable to pay scheduled utility bills) 
in seven European Countries: Denmark, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain. The period of analysis is 
1994-2001. We also explore the dynamics of utilities deprivations focusing on the causes behind deprivation persistence. 
We differentiate between household heterogeneity and true state dependence. Then, controlling for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity, we use the magnitude of average partial effects to investigate the relevance of any state 
dependence and the impact of energy sector reforms on the probability of experiencing utilities deprivations and on state 
dependence. We find evidence that vertical disintegration in the energy sector and privatization increase the household 
probability of experiencing utilities deprivation. Moreover, vertical disintegration also increases the household persistence 
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1. Introduction 
In the late 1990s many European countries started comprehensive  restructuring of their energy industries , the typical 
ingredients of  the reforms are full or partial privatization, vertical disintegration, liberalization. These policies may have a 
direct impact on consumers’ welfare through changes in the potential access to the services, changes in quality of the 
services and changes in the tariff structure. In this paper we focus on the way in which energy sector reforms affect  social 
affordability.  The utility bill is  a non negligible component of consumers’ expenditures  and, as result of energy sector 
reforms and of tariff changes, the poor  may face substantive losses in the consumer’s surplus. For example, Ugaz and Price 
(2003) show that households in the bottom deciles of the income distribution suffer more intensively in absolute and relative 
(to their income) terms from tariffs rebalancing, particularly when under public ownership of the utilities there was cross-
subsidies 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of energy reforms on the household probability of experiencing utilities 
deprivation (that is, to be unable to pay scheduled utility bills) in seven European Countries: Denmark, Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain. The period of analysis is 1994-2001. The data we use are from European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), a survey that allows comparability of responses across the above mentioned countries . We also 
explore the dynamics of utilities deprivations focusing on the causes behind deprivation persistence. We differentiate 
between household heterogeneity (household could be heterogeneous with respect to characteristics that are relevant for the 
chance of experiencing deprivations) and true state dependence (experiencing utilities deprivations in a specific time period, 
in itself, increases the probability of undergoing deprivations in subsequent periods). Then, controlling for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity, we use the magnitude of average partial effects to investigate the relevance of any state 
dependence and the impact of energy sector reforms on the probability of experiencing utilities deprivations and on state 
dependence. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following three ways. First, it analyzes if energy sector reforms are 
beneficial to household consumers through the magnitude of the impact of these factors on the probability of experiencing 
utilities deprivation and on the probability of persistence in the status of deprivation. Note that we offer fresh empirical 
evidence on utilities deprivation in a period characterized by relevant restructuring and privatization reforms of utility 
sector, even if in its earlier stages ( ECHP data are unfortunately no more available beyond the years we consider): as far as 
we know, no previous studies focused on this issue. Second, we provide an analysis of the utilities deprivation dynamics 
identifying the causes of utilities deprivation: true state dependence, unobserved heterogeneity and/or observed 
heterogeneity. Third, to analyze the dynamics of utilities deprivation, we use an econometric technique, proposed by   3
Wooldridge 2005, able to estimate consistently a probit model with both lagged dependent and exogenous variables that 
have been never applied to this topic. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we shortly review the trends in energy sector reforms in the EU. 
Section 3 gives information about the data we use. In Section 4, we present the econometric technique we use to study the 
effects of energy reforms on the probability of experiencing utilities deprivation and on the probability of persist in the 
status of deprivation. Section 5 presents our empirical findings. Some conclusions are made in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Energy sector reforms and household welfare: research questions 
While one of the main advantages of energy sector reforms should be the extra efficiency engendered by an increased 
competition, in the first half of the 1990s, there is very little evidence of competition associated with reforms of energy 
sector in Europe, except for power generation (Hall, 1997).  In energy sector in EU, publicly owned companies continue to 
be important. In particular, in distribution, municipally-controlled companies are the norm (with the exception of the UK 
that is the only European country in having privatized entirely its electricity and gas industry, including the network 
infrastructures). Table 1 gives information on the ownership of electricity and gas industry in the countries that we analyze 
(Denmark, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain): in 1997 only Belgium and Spain have a partially 
privatized energy sector. However, during the period 1994-2001, we observe many changes in the degree of vertical 
integration, entry regulation and public ownership in the country we analyze. In Figure 4, we report the evolution of an 
indicator of regulatory conditions (IRC) by country. This indicator takes a maximum value equal to six (maximum 
regulation) and a minimum value of zero (no regulation). It is computed averaging the OECD indicators of regulatory for 
the electricity and gas sectors. The latter indicators give information about state ownership, barriers to entry, involvement in 
business operations and market structure (Figure 1 and 2). Even if a high degree of discretion is involved in the computation 
of the OECD indicators, they have the merit of transparency: in facts, it is possible to trace each reported value to the 
underlying detailed information about policies and market conditions. We found that France exhibits the maximum level of 
regulation during the entire period of study (even if some energy reforms are implemented from 1998). Spain, instead, 
exhibits the lowest degree of regulation in 1994 and it implements further energy reforms during the period 1996-1999. The 
Netherlands starts with a degree of regulation about five in 1995 and implements a fast reform program decreasing its 
regulation index between 1998-2000 to a score of two.   4
It is often assumed that privatized companies, operating in a liberalized context, will necessarily be more efficient 
and cost-effective than public ones leading to better quality of the services and changes in the tariff structure that will 
benefit consumers through lower prices. The empirical evidence, however,  is mixed. Moreover, according to some critical 
evaluations, household energy prices do not seem to benefit from competition and improved efficiency: only industrial 
consumes have had some benefits from more competition because, at least in the earlier stages of reform, they were the only 
ones that could shop around for cheaper rates  (Hall, 1997). Household consumers may even suffer prices increase as a 
result of competition, as companies compete to win high-volume customers, while increasing prices for small consumers. 
Also, unbundling vertically integrated activities may increase the costs of providing power if economies of vertical 
integration exist. Figure 3 show, respectively, the evolution of real electricity and gas prices in Europe from 1994 to 2001. 
We have used Eurostat data about real household prices (tax included) in ppp at year 2000. During the entire period, Italy 
has the highest prices both in the electricity sector and in the gas sector. The Netherlands, one of the country that exhibits a 
fast deregulation, reports the strongest upward pressure on prices (especially, in the electricity sector). Note that electricity 
and gas prices result highly positively correlated (about 0.88). Instead, the correlation between the indicator of regulatory 
conditions (IRC) and the electricity and the gas prices results negative but low (respectively, -0.11 and -0.22): in first 
instance, deregulation seems to be associated with a slightly prices increase. Note that for the Netherlands the correlation 
between IRC and prices is above -0.8.  
There are reasons to claim that the impact of energy utility reforms on the poor is either positive or negative. In facts, 
tracing such  impact can be very complex. We may claim that energy sector reforms benefit the poor for the following 
reasons. First of all, reforms are supposed to contribute to growth (Cook and Uchida, 2001) and growth is required to reduce 
poverty and deprivation. Second, privatization is widely associated with development of the private sector (World Bank, 
2001): privatization is supposed to increase the number of players who have a stake in making sure that the private sector 
operates efficiently (Kikeri et al. 1992). Thus, competition and efficiency would benefit consumer through lower prices 
(lower production costs for industrial consumers). Thirdly, privatization is expected to provide fiscal benefits raising 
revenue for the government and by removing the burden for government to finance investment (Campbell-White and 
Bhatia, 1998): this should allow the government to spend more on services for the poor (World Bank, 2000). 
Energy sector reforms may also have a direct impact on consumers’ welfare through changes in the potential access 
to the services and changes in quality of the services. Note that these changes might penalize the poor. In facts, private firms 
in order to maximize profits are selective about the type of investment that they undertake and about the customers that they 
serve with a preference for supply large consumers. Chiwaya (1999) reports that a “possible consequence of private power   5
participation in a small economy is that independent power generation may remove high-load factor customers from the grid 
system. This is likely to result in increasing the cost of serving the remaining customers and thus in more defections, with 
higher costs and lower system reliability to be borne by the economy in general” (pp. 305). Moreover, private companies 
also demonstrate selectivity in their disconnections of non-payers after electricity privatization. We observe a fast expansion 
in the level of billing and installation of meters; but, increasing connections as well as investing in the network 
infrastructure are usually not high priorities.  
Finally, energy sector reforms may also penalize the poor through reduction in employment after privatization, 
sometimes affecting up to 50% of the workforce. “Employment cuts appear to be more severe under certain forms of 
privatization, such as the contracting out of certain parts of the industry and total privatization or where there is a 
combination of privatization and restructuring. Moreover, employment increases after privatization are rare and usually 
follow periods of large-scale retrenchment” (ILO, 1998, pp.1). There seems also to be evidence that privatization rises the 
disparity between pay levels within enterprises (Bayliss, 2002). However, at the aggregate national level the impact on 
poverty is small because in the EU countries the employees in energy sector represent just over 1% of all employees. 
Probably, however, the main direct impact on social welfare of energy utility reforms is through changes of tariffs, 
and particularly rebalancing when the companies shift way from cross-subsidies to the low users. This motivates our 
research: while a traditional approach to measuring welfare changes would consider statistical evidence on prices, 
consumption, and expenditures, in this paper we focus on non payment of utility bills, as reported by respondents to surveys 
in different countries and years. The advantage of this approach is that we can use micro-information on the characteristics 
of those households who declare to have experienced difficulties in paying their bills.  
The importance of looking into micro information as a complement to more aggregate data has been recently stressed 
by research at the World Bank on  poverty and energy reform in transition economies ( Lampietti et al., 2007). The increase 
in tariffs for the poor can create an undesirable combination of high arrears in payment, reduction of consumption, shift to 
less priced but also less sustainable energy sources. These changes are not well captured by statistical aggregate data, and it 
is important to know them in order to achieve a better design of reforms ( for example establishing forms of compensation 
to the poor or lifeline tariffs).  While the countries we consider are far richer than those considered in the above mentioned 
research, and consequently social affordability problems of energy reforms are less widespread,  we suggest that in some 
circumstances regulators and policy makers may have an interest to know more on these issues. This motivates our research.  
   6
3. The data 
In order to analyze utilities deprivation in EU, we use micro-data from all eight waves (1994-2001) of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP is a multi-country comparative household panel survey conducted 
annually by following the same sample of households and persons in the Member States of the European Union. The main 
advantage of the ECHP is that it permits us to analyze economic and social household conditions from a dynamic point of 
view.  
Our unit of analysis is the household. To define if a household suffers of utilities deprivations we use the information 
given by answers to the following question: “Has the household been unable to pay scheduled utility bills, such as 
electricity, water, gas during the past 12 months?”.
1 Information about household attributes (i.e. no. of household working 
members, household size, household income) and social characteristics of the reference person (i.e. sex, age, education) are 
also available.  
We focus on seven European countries (we had to exclude other countries because of data availability problems): 
Denmark, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain.
2 Descriptive statistics about the sample composition by 
country are reported in Table 4. In Table 5, we reports utilities deprivation rates for each country from 1994 to 2001. We 
observe that Ireland and France are the countries with the highest utilities deprivation rates in 1994 (about 9%). The 
Netherlands has, instead, the lowest proportion of population deprived in utilities: about 2%. In 2001, the percentage of 
people suffering utilities deprivations results lower in all countries. Note that the country that experienced the wider 
decrease in deprivation is Ireland. Table 6 gives some more information about who the household deprived in utilities are. 
About 44% of the deprived household is also poor,
3 while only the 16% of the not deprived household is poor. As expected, 
deprived households have the highest percentages of female and low educated reference persons.  The mean household size 
and the mean number of household worker members are, respectively, higher and lower for deprived households than the 
ones registered for no deprived households.  
  Finally, to describe the national reform patterns on vertical integration, entry regulation and public ownership by 
sector we use REGREF, a database developed by the OECD. See Figure 1 and 2 for details about the indicators 
construction, and Table 2 and 3 for descriptive statistics. 
                                                 
1 Note that, for Italy and The Netherlands, this question has been asked only if the household have declared some degree of 
difficulty in make ends meet. Therefore, our utilities deprivation indicator assumes value equal to one if both the household 
has been unable to pay bills and the household has experienced difficulty in making ends meet. 
2 Note that information on energy domestic prices and utilities deprivation over the entire period 1994-2001 is available 
only for these six countries included in the ECHP.  
3 Percentage computed using as poverty line the 60% of the median equivalent household income.   7
      
 
4. The Model 
Static analysis 
We construct an individual indicator of utilities deprivations that is equal to one if deprivation occurs and zero if it 
does not. This is a binary outcome variable, therefore we initially estimate the effects of energy regulation changes on the 
probability of being deprived using a standard probit model on repeated cross-section data with correction for clustering of 
errors at the household level of deprivation. The explanatory variables also includes household size, number of household 
working members, household equivalent income (in ppp), controls for sex, age and education level of the household 
reference person, year dummies and country dummies. 
The results of the standard analysis might be not correct if there are households’ unobserved characteristics that 
persist over time. Including unobserved heterogeneity, the model can be formally written as 
 
(1)     P(yit = 1⎪xit ) = φ (xitβ+ ci) 
 
where φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, the dependent variable yit  is the utilities 
deprivation state of household i at time t, ci  is the household specific effect, xit is a vector of regressors (including energy 
regulation indicators), and the parameters β are the parameters that have to be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
Dynamic analysis 
To analyze how utilities deprivation evolves over time, we use a dynamic panel data probit model proposed by 
Wooldridge, 2005 (see also Poggi, 2007, for an application). In simple words, we analyze the impact of past deprivation on 
actual deprivation controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Note that this method requires a balanced panel. 
For household i observed from time t=1 to t=7,
4 the conditional probability that deprivation occurs is 
 
(2)       P(yit = 1⎪y it-1 , … , yio , ci ) = φ (zitγ+ρyit-1 + ci ). 
 
                                                 
4 Note that t=0 refers the first available wave (that is 1994), while the period of study is 1995-2001   8
where zi and zit are respectively vectors of time-constant and time-varying explanatory variables. Note that we are assuming 
the followings:  first, the dynamics are first order, once ci is conditioned on; second, the unobserved effect is additive inside 
the distribution function, φ. As suggested by Wooldridge (2005), the parameters in (2) can be consistently estimated by 
specifying a density for the household specific effect given the deprivation initial condition, yi0, and the time-constant 
explanatory variables, zi.
5 Therefore, we assume that 
 




where a0, a1 and a2 are parameters to be estimated and σ
2
a  is the conditional standard deviation of the household specific 
effect, ci. Note that the vector zi appears in (3), and not on the right hand side of equation (2), because otherwise we could 
not identify the coefficients for the time constant covariates.  
Given (2) and (3), we can write the conditional density for the conditional distribution as 
 
f(yit , …, y iT ⎪yio , ci ;ρ) = Π t {φ (ρyit-1 + ci )
yt . [1-φ (ρyit-1 + ci )]
1-yt} 
 
Then, we maximize the density obtained integrating the above equation respect to the normal distribution in (3) in order to 
estimate the parameters ρ, a0, a1, a2, σ
2
a. The estimation is consistent only under the hypothesis that the model is correctly 
specified. Note that in the model, the value of ρ determines if the deprivation sequence {yit } features true state dependence 
while the estimate of σ
2
a indicates the size of the dispersion accounted by unobserved heterogeneity. Finally,  we estimate 
the impact of variations in energy regulation on the probability of experiencing utility deprivation (averaged over the 
distribution of the other attributes in the population) using the following consistent estimator of the average partial effects: 
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5 This represents a simple solution to the initial condition problems in dynamic non-linear panel data models with 
unobserved heterogeneity. In this way, it is possible to account for correlation between the households specific effects and 
levels of deprivation experienced by the households in the initial period and for correlation between unobserved and 
observed households characteristics.    9
where the parameters are estimated using the conditional MLEs and the a  subscript denotes multiplication by  









+ a σ  
Finally, note the Wooldridge’s method for estimating a dynamic probit model has some advantages in facing 
selection and attrition problems. In particular, it allows selection and attrition to depend on the initial conditions and, 
therefore, it allows attrition to differ across initial levels of deprivation. In particular, individuals with different initial 
statuses are allowed to have different missing data probabilities. Thus, it is possible to consider selection and attrition 
without explicitly modelling them as a function of the initial conditions (Wooldridge, 2005).  
 
 
5. Empirical results 
In order to understand the impacts of energy sector reform on utilities deprivation and on its dynamics, we estimate 
the models presented in the previous section. We discuss the results in two stages. First, we present the estimate of the static 
analysis. Second, we show the results of the dynamic analysis emphasizing the importance of the dynamics in the model and 
the impact on the dynamics of energy reforms.  
 
Statics analysis 
In the first instance, we estimate on pooled data correcting the standard errors for correlation at the household level. 
The estimates and the robust standard errors are presented in the first two columns of Table 7.
6 The results are typical of 
those found in the literature of poverty and deprivation. The household probabilities of experiencing utilities deprivation is 
higher if the reference person is medium and low educated, and it is lower if the reference person is male; moreover, the 
probability of being deprived decreases when age rises, and when the number of household working members increases. As 
expected, only huge variations in income reduce the probabilities of experiencing utilities deprivation. Note that the 
probability of being deprived rises when the number of household member increases: if we consider the latter as a proxy of 
household energy consumption, we find that the probability of being deprived increases when consumption (and, therefore, 
the amount to pay) rises. Of most interest in this regression are the estimated coefficients on energy regulation indicators.  A 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 The reference group is composed of Danish households with as reference person a high educated female; the omitted year 
dummy refers to 1994.   10
decrease in the degree of electricity or gas public ownership (i.e. privatization) rises the probability of experiencing utilities 
deprivation. Also, a reduction in the degree of electricity vertical integration increases the probability of being deprived. 
Decreases in the entry regulation (i.e. liberalization) seem to not have statistically significant effects on utilities deprivation 
during the period of study.  Finally, the probability of experiencing deprivation decreases over time and it varies across 
Countries. 
The previous conclusions may well be incorrect if there are unobserved characteristics which differ systematically 
between households. Thus, we move to panel analysis. Column 3 and 4 of Table 7 report coefficients and standard 
deviations using the random effects estimator and unbalanced panel (Column 5 and 6 report coefficients and standard errors 
using the random effects estimator and balanced panel). Much unobserved heterogeneity is found, but the results are similar 
at the ones of the standard probit model. Of most interest, only the estimated coefficient of the electricity vertical integration 
and the gas public ownership are clearly statistically significant.
7 Note that we also re-estimated the model correcting for 
correlation at the country level: the coefficients associated to electricity vertical integration and gas public ownership are 
still statistically significant, respectively, at 10% level and at 1% level.
8 Therefore, we can conclude that decreasing vertical 
integration in electricity sector and reducing public ownership in gas sector lead to higher probabilities of experiencing 
utilities deprivation in the period of study.
9  Instead, electricity public ownership and gas entry regulation are slightly 
statistically significant (at 10% level) only if the unbalanced panel is used (and if we do not correct for correlation at 
country level), thus no conclusions may be draw. 
   
 Dynamic analysis 
The static analysis, that we made, indicates that reforms in the degree of vertical integration in the electricity sector 
and changes in the level of public ownership in the gas sector clearly affect the probability of experiencing utilities 
deprivation during 1994-2001. Thus, we ideally wish to understand the impact of these factors on the dynamics of utilities 
deprivation. But, in order to estimate the latter, we need to focus on the period 1995-2001 (using the information about the 
household levels of deprivation at 1994 as initial condition) and, during this period, we do not observe any reforms in the 
                                                 
7 These variables result statistically significant at 1% level if the unbalanced panel is used; while, they result statistically 
significant at 10% level if the balanced panel is used. The decrease in the degree of significance of these variables may be 
due to small variations in the sample composition when we move from the unbalanced to the balance panel. 
8 The estimates are available up to requirement. 
9 Note that we tested alternative specifications of the model. In particular, we tested the following specifications: first, a 
specification with area dummies at level NUTs 2; second, a specification including macro-economic variables; third, a 
specification including an index of the real household  price for  electricity and gas. All these specifications lead to the same   11
level of public ownership. In particular, we observed that the level of public ownership changes only in Belgium and Italy 
from a degree of public ownership equal to five in 1994 to levels of public ownership, respectively, equal to one and three 
in 1995.  No other variations are registered during the period of study. Therefore, our attention needs to be restricted to the 
impact of reforms in electricity vertical integration on the dynamics of deprivation from 1995 to 2001.  
We estimate the dynamic probit model presented in Section 4 and we present in Table 8 the conditional maximum 
likelihood estimates and the asymptotic standard errors. In our specification of the model, we include a variable that 
captures the degree of vertical integration in the electricity sector in country j at time t: this is our variable of interest. As 
before, the explanatory variables also include sex, age and education dummies for the household reference person, 
household size, the number of household working members, the equivalent income, year dummies and country dummies.
 10 
We also include for the time-varying indicator of vertical integration, the corresponding time-invariant dummies 
(vert_96,…, vert_01) in order to allow for a correlation between the household specific effects and the indicator of vertical 
integration. Following the same motivation, we also include as covariate the mean over time of the remaining time-varying 
variables. Note that our model permits us to correct for eventual selection and attrition problems and to solve the initial 
condition problem that arises since the start of the observation period does not coincide with the start of the stochastic 
process generating household deprivation experiences (see Section 4).  
After controlling for the unobserved effects and observed heterogeneity, the coefficient on the lagged utilities 
deprivation is highly statistically significant . The initial value of utilities deprivation is also very important, and it implies 
that there is substantial correlation between the initial condition and the unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, the coefficient on 
initial deprivation (1.04) is larger than the coefficient on the lag (0.71). Moreover, the estimate of the conditional standard 
error of ci (σa) is equal to 0.65 and it is statistically different from zero: this means that there is a lot of unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Among the explanatory variables included, if the reference person is male, the household has a lower 
probability of experiencing utilities deprivation. Instead, if the reference person is low educated, the household has a higher 
probability of experiencing deprivation. The probability of experiencing utilities deprivation decreases when the number of 
household working members rises and when the reference person becomes older. The coefficient of household size is 
positive and statistically different from zero. Of most interest, the estimate coefficient of the indicator of electricity vertical 
integration is negative and statistically significant: unbundling vertical integrated activities is associated with a higher 
                                                                                                                                                                        
results about the signs of the coefficients associated with vertical integration and public ownership  (and their statistically 
significance). 
10 The reference group is composed of Danish households with as reference person a high educated female; the omitted year 
dummy refers to 1996.   12
probability of utilities deprivation. A possible explanation may be found in the presence of economies of vertical 
integration: in facts, unbundling vertical integrated activities in presence of economies of vertical integration increases the 
costs of providing power having, in last instance, upward pressures on prices (that are presumable positive correlated with 
utilities deprivation).
11 
Using the consistent estimator of the average partial effect illustrated in Section 4, we estimate the size of the 
dynamics. Thus, we estimate the probability of being deprived given that the household is or is not deprived in the former 
year. The difference is an estimate of the state dependence of being deprived in utilities. The probability to experience 
utilities deprivation given that the household is deprived in the former year is about 7.61%, while it decreases to 2.61% if 
the household is not deprived the year before. Thus, the estimation of the state dependence of utilities deprivation is about 
0.0500: this means that households experiencing deprivations in the former period have 5% higher probability of being 
deprived than those not deprived the year before (Table 9). 
We also estimate the impact of variations in electricity vertical integration on the conditional probability of 
experiencing utilities deprivation (Table 9). If we suppose that the vertical integration is maximum (that is, the indicator is 
equal to six), the probability of experiencing utilities deprivation is about 2.64%, but it increases to 6.39% if the household 
is deprived in the former year. If we suppose that the electricity vertical integration is minimum (that is, the indicator is 
equal to zero), the probability of experiencing utilities deprivation is 5.69% and it increases to 12.11% if the household is 
deprived in the former year. Therefore, the probability of experiencing utilities deprivation increases when vertical 
integration decreases (either if the household is or not is deprived in the former year). Of most interest, the estimated state 
dependence increases when electricity vertical integration decreases: if vertical integration is maximum, households 
experiencing deprivations in the former year have 4.24% higher probability of being deprived than those not deprived the 
year before, this probability increases to 7.05% if the indicator of vertical integration is equal to zero. Therefore, unbundling 
vertical integrated activities does not only increase the probability of experiencing utilities deprivation but it also increases 
the probability of persistence in the status of deprived. 
 
 
                                                 
11 For example, see Beccio and Piacenza (2004) for evidence of economies of vertical integration in the Italian electricity 
sector.   13
Conclusions 
This study provide an analysis of the effects of energy reforms on the household probability of experiencing utilities 
deprivation in seven European Countries (Denmark, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain) during the 
period 1994-2001. The dynamics of utilities deprivations and the impact of energy reforms on the household persistence in 
the status of deprivation are also studied. Note that, using descriptive statistics, we show that in average only about 5.98% 
of the households in the sample experiences utilities deprivation in 1994.  At the end of the period of study, the percentage 
of people suffering utilities deprivations results lower in all countries. 
Our main findings are the following ones. First, we do find evidence that unbundling vertical integrated activities in 
energy sector and reducing public ownership in gas sector lead to higher probability of experiencing utilities deprivation in 
the period of study. Second, looking at the persistence of utilities deprivation over time, we do find evidence of household 
heterogeneity and true state dependence, even after controlling for observed household differences. Observed household 
characteristics, and household initial conditions, also appear strictly related to the probability of experiencing utilities 
deprivation. Third, not only the probability of experiencing utilities deprivation increases when electricity vertical 
integration decreases, but the estimated true state dependence increases when vertical integration decreases. 
While the effects we have been able to detect are small, and the overall utility deprivation issue is limited and 
decreasing in the countries we have considered, our findings suggest  three questions for future research. First, the existence 
of  true state dependence implies that regulators or policy-makers should focus on specific consumers, where the simple fact 
of having been unable to pay a bill is an important predictor of future behavior. Thus, matching survey data with 
information available to the suppliers would offer a more complete picture of the problem and would help to identify 
possible remedial actions. 
Secondly, there is some  (limited) evidence that decreasing public ownership increases utility deprivation. While this 
finding may seem to go against the efficiency rationale of privatization, and the implication of lower costs (and prices, 
under competition) it is, however, consistent with the traditional objectives of state- or municipally owned companies and 
their pricing policies.   
Third, and perhaps more controversial, we have found robust evidence that unbundling increases the probability of 
deprivation. This is what one would expect if there are economies from vertical integration that are going to be lost after 
restructuring. In fact, full liberalization was not operative in the years we consider, and one may think that those costs are 
necessary to achieve future benefits of competition on subsequent years. This is, however, an issue that has to be left to   14
future research, that can be particularly needed for the new Member States of the EU, where poverty is more widespread, 
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(ck)  Coding of data 
Entry regulation:  1/3                     
  Regulated TPA  Negotiated TPA  No TPA  How are the terms and conditions of third party access 
(TPA) to the electricity transmission grid determined?    1/3  0  3  6 
  yes  no  Is there a liberalised wholesale market for electricity (a 
wholesale pool)?    1/3  0  6 
 
No 
threshold  <250 gigawatts 
Between 
250 and 500 
gigawatts 








What is the minimum consumption threshold that 
consumers must exceed in order to be able to choose 
their electricity supplier ?     1/3  0  1  2  3  4  6 
                        
Public ownership:  1/3                    
  Private  Mostly Private  Mixed  Mostly Public  Public  What is the ownership structure of the largest companies 
in the generation, transmission, distribution, and supply 
segments of the electricity industry?    1  0  1.5  3  4.5  6 
Vertical Integration:  1/3                      
  Separate Companies  Accounting separation  Integrated  What is the degree of vertical separation between the 
transmission and generation segments of the electricity 
industry?    1/2  0  3  6 
Unbundled  Mixed  Integrated 
What is the overall degree of vertical integration in the 
electricity industry?   1/2  0  3  6 
Country scores (0-6)  Sjbj Skck answerjk 
Source: OECD  16
Figure 2.  Sectoral Indicator of regulatory reform: Gas 
Gas 
  
Weights by theme (bj) Question  weights  (ck) 
Coding of data 
Entry regulation:  1/4                      
  Regulated TPA  Negotiated TPA  No TPA  How are the terms and conditions of third party access (TPA) to the gas 
transmission grid determined?    1/3  0  3  6 
What percentage of the retail market is open to consumer choice?   
1/3  (1-% of market open to choice/100)*6 
  No, free entry in all markets Yes, in some markets Yes, in all markets Do national, state or provincial laws or other regulations restrict the number 
of competitors allowed to operate a business in at least some markets in the 
sector: gas production/import    1/3  0  3  6 
Public ownership:  1/4                    
  None  Between 0 and 100 % 100%  What percentage of shares in the largest firm in the gas production/import 
sector are owned by government?    1/3  0  3  6 
What percentage of shares in the largest firm in the gas transmission sector 
are owned by government?   
1/3  0  3  6 
What percentage of shares in the largest firm in the gas distribution sector are 
owned by government?   
1/3  0  3  6 
Vertical Integration:  1/4                    
  Ownership separation 
Legal/Accounting 
separation  Integrated  What is the degree of vertical separation between gas production/import and 
the other segments of the industry?    1/2  0  3  6 
What is the degree of vertical separation between gas supply and the other 
segments of the industry?   
3/10  0  3  6 
Is gas distribution vertically separate from gas supply?   
1/5  0  3  6 
Country scores (0-6)  Sjbj Skck answerjk 
Source: OECD  17
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Table 1. Dominant ownership of electricity and gas industry in EU, 1997 
(M=municipal; P=private; S=state) 
Country Electricity  Electricity  Electricity  Gas    Gas 
  Generation Transmission Distribution Transmission Distribution
Denmark M  S/M  M/P  S  S 
Belgium P  P  P/M S/P  P/M 
France  S  S S  S S 
Ireland  S  S S  S S 
Italy  S  S S  S M 
Netherlands S  S  M  S/P  M 
Spain S/P  S  S/P  S/P S/P 
 Source: Hall, 1997 
 
Table 2. OECD indicators of regulatory conditions: electricity 
Electricity         Entry regulation        Public ownership       Vertical integration 
    1994 2001 1994 2001 1994 2001
Denmark  6 0.3 4.5 3 6 1.5
Netherlands 6  0.3 6 0 4.5 1.5
Belgium  5 2.3 1.5 1.5 6 1.5
France 6  2.3  6 6 6 4.5
Ireland 6  2.3  6 6 4.5 1.5
Italy 6  2.3  6 3 6 1.5
Spain 5  0.3  3 1.5 3 1.5
 
Table 3. OECD indicators of regulatory conditions: gas 
Electricity         Entry regulation        Public ownership       Vertical integration 
    1994 2001 1994 2001 1994 2001
Denmark 4  2.4  6 6 3 0.9
Netherlands 6  2.1 6 2 4.8 3.9
Belgium 4  2.1  4 1 4.8 3.9
France  6 6 6 6 6 6
Ireland 6  3.5  6 6 6 6
Italy 6  3.1  6 3 4.8 3.3
Spain 6  4.6  6 0 6 3.9
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Year is 1994  Netherl. Belgium France Ireland Italy  Spain Denmark
Proportion of household                     
   reference person: male  84.31 80.34 84.00 84.13 90.12  89.72  60.92
   reference person: low education  13.08 26.32 30.81 54.08 57.02  67.45  25.38
Mean no. of household working members  1.27 1.33 1.18 1.49 1.38  1.26  1.33
Mean no. of household members  2.73 2.89 2.84 3.99 3.36  3.57  2.44
Mean age  41.4 40.3 40.6 43.0 43.8  44.4  41.6
Total net equivalent household income  10995 12908  11449 9075  8582  7584   11671
Proportion of poor household  13.68 16.83 18.14 21.86 21.49  21.25  8.86
No. observation (unbalanced)  4151 2602 5671 3024 5406  5285  2664





Table 5. Proportion of household deprived in utilities 
Country  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Denmark  3.30% 2.45% 2.47% 2.40% 1.93% 1.70% 1.58% 1.56%
The  Netherlands  1.73% 1.36% 1.35% 1.57% 1.09% 1.06% 1.10% 1.16%
Belgium  6.65% 5.74% 6.04% 7.08% 6.07% 4.73% 4.91% 5.82%
France  9.42% 8.21% 8.01% 7.29% 7.05% 6.05% 6.19% 5.72%
Ireland  9.46% 7.00% 7.10% 5.65% 4.10% 3.73% 2.41% 2.94%
Italy  4.44% 4.02% 4.30% 4.14% 3.52% 3.63% 3.36% 3.42%
Spain  6.23% 4.69% 4.00% 4.20% 3.12% 2.30% 2.34% 2.42%
All  5.98% 4.91% 4.83% 4.61% 3.88% 3.36% 3.23% 3.27%
 
 
Table 6: who are the households deprived in utilities? 
% household  (1995-2001)  If deprived 
If not 
deprived 
   Poor  43.69 15.83
   reference person: male  67.47 76.04
   reference person: low education  58.22 43.54
 
Mean household size  3.36 2.99
Mean num of household working members  0.99 1.38
Mean  total net equivalent household income  7220 11798
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Table 7. Estimation results (Model A) 
Dependent variable is         Unbalanced panel         Unbalanced panel          Balanced panel 
Utilities deprivation  Coef.    
Robust 
S.E. Coef.    S.E. Coef.     S.E. 
Reference person: male  -0.2330 ***  0.0255 -0.3105 ***  0.0244  -0.2827  ***  0.0425
Reference person: age  -0.0106 ***  0.0012 -0.0168 ***  0.0010  -0.0115  ***  0.0020
Ref. person: medium education  0.1451 ***  0.0470 0.2825 ***  0.0332  0.1571  ***  0.0533
Ref. person:  low education  0.3252 ***  0.0660 0.5249 ***  0.0324  0.3818  ***  0.0532
No. of household members  0.0846 ***  0.0198 0.1296 ***  0.0075  0.0711  ***  0.0129
No. of household working members  -0.2038 ***  0.0367 -0.2741 ***  0.0120  -0.1985  ***  0.0189
Household equivalent income  -0.00005 **  0.0000 -0.00003 ***  0.0000  -0.0001  ***  0.0000
Electricity: entry regulation  0.0033   0.0114 0.0038   0.0150  0.0320    0.0240
Electricity: public ownership  -0.0167 *  0.0093 -0.0218 *  0.0127  -0.0023    0.0213
Electricity: vertical integration  -0.0355 ***  0.0109 -0.0507 ***  0.0150  -0.0432  *  0.0224
Gas: entry regulation  0.0160   0.0133 0.0294 *  0.0164  0.0109    0.0270
Gas: public owenership  -0.0387 ***  0.0103 -0.0537 ***  0.0149  -0.0439  *  0.0245
Gas: vertical integration  0.0297   0.0191 0.0181   0.0224  -0.0257    0.0340
Year is 1995  -0.1267 ***  0.0205 -0.2018 ***  0.0283  -0.1688  ***  0.0447
Year is 1996  -0.1287 ***  0.0230 -0.2170 ***  0.0291  -0.1429  ***  0.0451
Year is 1997  -0.1473 ***  0.0263 -0.2602 ***  0.0297  -0.2063  ***  0.0459
Year is 1998  -0.2015 ***  0.0351 -0.3613 ***  0.0319  -0.3306  ***  0.0489
Year is 1999  -0.2835 ***  0.0431 -0.4844 ***  0.0492  -0.3797  ***  0.0754
Year is 2000  -0.3026 ***  0.0535 -0.5164 ***  0.0655  -0.4308  ***  0.1023
Year is 2001  -0.2883 ***  0.0618 -0.5164 ***  0.0699  -0.3806  ***  0.1088
Country is The Netherlands  -0.6366 ***  0.0802 -0.8209 ***  0.0955  -0.8205  ***  0.1583
Country is Belgium  0.1893 **  0.0758 0.3138 ***  0.0986  0.3790  **  0.1641
Country is France  0.3828 ***  0.0729 0.6291 ***  0.0797  0.7000  ***  0.1226
Country is Ireland  0.0837   0.0941 0.3028 ***  0.0899  0.4015  ***  0.1427
Country is Italy  -0.1792 **  0.0831 -0.0991   0.0735  -0.0791    0.1208
Country is Spain  -0.5526 ***  0.1242 -0.5279 ***  0.1313  -0.2991    0.2102
Constant -0.5406 **  0.2339 -1.2257 ***  0.1563  -1.1911  ***  0.2560
sigma_a           1.0682 ***  0.0119  1.0801  ***  0.0195
Rho          0.5330 ***  0.0056  0.5385  ***  0.0090
Pseudo-R2   0.1303         0.1162         0.0750       
Log-Likelihood   -28456         -24983         -10047       
Note:   (***) means statistically significant at 1%, (**) means statistically significant at 5%, and (*) means statistically 
significant at 10%   21
Table 8.  Estimation results (Model B) 
 
Dependent variable is          Balanced panel 
Utilities deprivation  Coef.     S.E. 
Lag utilities deprivation  0.7108 *** 0.0353
utilities deprivation at 1994  1.0388 *** 0.0458
Reference person is male  -0.1638 *** 0.0367
Reference person: age  -0.0085 *** 0.0017
Reference person: education is medium  0.0273   0.0483
Reference person: education is low  0.1393 *** 0.0475
No. of household members (at 1994)  0.0483 *** 0.0123
No. of household working members (hwork)  -0.0861 *** 0.0235
Household equivalent income (income)  -0.00002 *** 0.0000
Electricity: vertical integration (vert)  -0.0911 **  0.0358
Year is 1995  -0.0816   0.1704
Year is 1997  -0.3231 **  0.1548
Year is 1998  -0.4568 *** 0.1599
Year is 1999  -0.6579 *** 0.1663
Year is 2000  -0.5888 *** 0.1706
Year is 2001  -0.6685 *** 0.1831
Country is The Netherlands  -0.4945 *** 0.0976
Country is Belgium  0.3824 *** 0.0768
Country is France  0.3970 *** 0.0685
Country is Ireland  0.0235   0.0858
Country is Italy  -0.0045   0.0738
Country is Spain  -0.3388 *** 0.1086
vert_96 -0.0084   0.0324
vert_97 0.0381   0.0297
vert_98 0.0386   0.0306
vert_99 0.0610 *  0.0320
vert_00 0.0211   0.0353
vert_01 0.0499   0.0384
m_hwork -0.0987 *** 0.0354
m_income -0.0001 *** 0.0000
Constant -0.6496 *** 0.2350
sigma_u 0.6457 *** 0.0133
Rho 0.2942 *** 0.0085
Pseudo-R2 0.2743    
Log-Likelihood   7882.88      
Note:   (***) means statistically significant at 1%, (**) means statistically significant at 5%, and (*) means statistically         
 significant  at  10%. 
  The variable m_x is the mean over time of the variable x.   22
Table 9.  Estimated partial effects and state dependence (Model B) 
   All sample  Deprived at t-1  Not deprived at t-1  Estimate state dependence 
          
Prob of being deprived at t  3.13%  7.61% 2.61% 5.00%
           
Prob of being deprived at t            
   if vertical integration is 0  5.69% 12.11% 5.06% 7.05%
   if vertical integration is 1  5.04% 11.42% 4.42% 7.00%
   if vertical integration is 2  4.45% 10.33% 3.85% 6.48%
   if vertical integration is 3  3.91% 9.21% 3.35% 5.86%
   if vertical integration is 4  3.44% 8.18% 2.90% 5.28%
   if vertical integration is 5  3.01% 7.24% 2.50% 4.74%
   if vertical integration is 6  2.64% 6.39% 2.15% 4.24%
              
Note: vertical integration refers to the electricity sector and it is an indicator assuming value between zero (minimal vertical 
integration) and six (maximum vertical integration); deprivation is utilities deprivation. 
 
 
 
  